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The Decree of 19 August 1848: The First
Repatriation Commissions and Postwar
Settlements Along the U.S.-Mexico
Borderlands
JOSÉ ANGEL HERNÁNDEZ†

I. INTRODUCTION
Like all other wars that bring about destruction and chaos in their
wake, these eventful ruptures in the historical structure are also
moments of creativity and introspection surrounding the meaning of
the nation, and its legacy. The end of the war simultaneously brought
about the creation of the Department of Colonization because many
amongst the intelligentsia believed that a failure to colonize and
populate those areas lost to the US was the primary reason for this
recent partition.1 To this end, the northern frontier was divided into
three regions, and a Repatriate Commission was assigned to each: New
Mexico, Texas and California.2 The primary function of these
Repatriate Commissions, just like the Department of Colonization, was
to identify, administer, and then to accommodate those Mexican
citizens that opted to migrate southward across the new international
boundary following the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
© 2018 José Angel Hernández
† Ph.D. Department of History, The University of Houston.
1. PROYECTOS DE COLONIZACIÓN PRESENTADOS POR LA JUNTA DIRECTIVA DEL RAMO, AL
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES DE LA REPÚBLICA MEXICANA EN 5 DE JULIO DE 1848, (M. . .xico:
Imprenta de Vicente García Torres, 1848) (1848) (Mex.). Full copy is available at CÓDIGO DE
COLONIZACIÓN Y TERRENOS BALDÍOS DE LA REPÚBLICA MEXICANA, FORMADO POR FRANCISCO
F. DE LA MAZA Y PUBLICADO SEGÚN EL ACUERDO DEL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA, POR
CONDUCTA DE LA SECRETARÍA DE ESTADO Y DEL DESPACHO DE FOMENTO, AÑOS DE 1451 A
1892, 368–398 (México: Oficina Tipográfica de la Secretaria de Fomento) (1893) [hereinafter
Código de Colonización].
2. See id. at 400–06; see also id. at 407–12.
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(1848).3 Because the New Mexico Territory was the most heavily
populated, the creation of the First Repatriation Commission for this
region was considered the most important of the three eventual
assignments.4 Post-war instabilities, strapped financial resources,
shifting geo-political boundaries, resistance by U.S. authorities, and
internal accusations of financial mismanagement and corruption all
contributed to the dissolution of these initial Repatriation
Commissions.5 Legislation implemented to encourage Mexican
citizens to return via the Department of Colonization and the
Repatriation Commissions provided both the power of the Law and the
agents of the government to the foundation of dozens of settlements
along the newly established frontiers.6 In the end, colonies nevertheless
emerged along the northern frontiers between the New Mexico
Territory and through Baja California, due in large part to the will and
survival skills of the repatriates themselves.7
With the fallout of the war between the US and Mexico unfolding
during the signing of the treaties of peace in the mid nineteenth
century, the question about Mexican citizens left in the ceded
territories continued to be of concern for both countries particularly the
question of citizenship. In accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848),8 the Treaty stipulated that those
individuals could either stay where they were at or they could leave
south towards the shrinking International boundaries of the Mexican
Republic.9 If they opted to stay, which recent estimates suggest that
3. Id. at 11 (Original: “esas colonias en las costas y fronteras pueden y deben ser, con
mayor éxito, compuestas de Mexicanos”).
4. This article read as follows:
“Artículo 22 de la ley de 14 de junio de 1848: “Queda autorizado el Gobierno
para invertir hasta doscientos mil pesos del fondo de que habla el artículo 2º (el
de indemnización que paguen los Estados Unidos) de esta ley en la traslación de
las familias mexicanas que no quieran permanecer en el territorio cedido a los
Estados Unidos y soliciten establecerse en la República. Esta cantidad podrá
aumentarse con presencia de los presupuestos respectivos, que el mismo
Gobierno presentará al Congreso.”
“Asunto: Ramón Ortiz—Nombramiento del citado para que pase a Nuevo M. . .xico,
comisionado para la traslación de familias a territorio de la República, 1848,” ARCHIVO
HISTÓRICO SECRETARÍA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES [HISTORICAL ARCHIVE OF THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS] L-E-1975 (XXV) [hereinafter AHSRE].
5. José Angel Hernández, El México Perdido, El México Olvidado, y El México de
Afuera: A History of Mexican American Colonization 1836-1892, 195–220 (2008) (published
Ph.D. dissertation, on file with University of Chicago).
6. Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 407–12.
7. JOSÉ ANGEL HERNÁNDEZ, MEXICAN AMERICAN COLONIZATION DURING THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY: A HISTORY OF THE US-MEXICO BORDERLANDS, 225–231 (2012).
8. Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, Mex.-U.S., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (1850).
9. Id.
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70% remained within the territorial confines of the US, automatic U.S.
citizenship was conferred within the year.10 For those that opted to
leave, some very generous offers of land were made by the Mexican
government in their efforts to try and resettle and repopulate the fringes
of their decreasing borders with “Modern Mexicans” who had acquired
particular modern skills in agriculture, livestock, and martial arts.11
These historical circumstances and the Mexican government’s
response to repatriation and settlement set a pattern in motion that
continues to this day—the continuing circularity of Mexican migration
in both the US and Mexico.
To analyze and contextualize this particular legal history, it is
important to examine a number of regional cases of repatriation
beyond those from New Mexico, specifically a series of repatriations
from the territories of Texas and California. In heretofore unexamined
archival documents that detail the repatriation experience in a
comparative fashion, I examine the formation of the first Repatriation
Commissions charged with encouraging the repatriation of its citizens;
a detailed examination of its initial efforts at recruiting repatriates; the
work of establishing colonies along the frontiers of the new
International Boundary; and the competing interests that pitted the
realpolitik of state necessities against the pragmatic interests of
repatriates themselves. Our examination of the process of repatriation
to Mexico begins with a review of the establishment of the commission
charged with this arduous task. The laws and decrees debated and
passed by the Mexican Congress and Senate are a useful compass to
follow in order to understand what entailed the first Repatriation
Commission from the 1850s to perhaps more contemporary efforts by
the Mexican government to accommodate the millions of repatriates
that have arrived since, particularly those currently under the threat of
deportation.12
II. SOME NUMBERS AND CONTEXT
Approximately “twenty-five percent of the total Mexican
American population of the Southwest in the 1850s” returned to
Mexico in the four decades following the end of hostilities, but more
research into these particular numbers would be necessary for more

10. Id.
11. Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 407–412.
12. For a broader outline, see Hernández, supra note 5. A condensed version of the twovolume study appeared as HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 7.
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accurate estimates.13 A number of scholars in the past generation have
debated the number of Mexican citizens that were left in the ceded
territories following the Mexican-American War, and their numbers
have steadily fluctuated between 116,000 to upwards of 250,000, or
around 1% of Mexico’s total population during this era.14 Mexican
citizens in what is now the American southwest constituted around 1%
of the total population of Mexico during this time, thus Mexican
officials actively sought to repatriate and accommodate those Mexican
citizens willing to move across the new international boundary
following an end to hostilities.15 Although accurate figures would be
almost impossible to determine because of the imprecision of
statistical data then and now, a few studies have surfaced over the past
few years that shed light on repatriation and return migrations. Some
comparison with similar cases might be of use for gauging the number
of return migrants during the middle to late nineteenth century, but
these are merely comparative in nature. For instance, Historian Mark
Wyman notes for the case of return immigrants in Europe that “During
this era of mass immigration, from approximately 1880-1930 when
restriction laws and the Great Depression choked it off, from onequarter to one-third of all European immigrants to the United States
permanently returned home.”16 These particular historical trends
therefore mirror in some parts those estimates that we read about with
return migration to Mexico during the same periodization. Many of
these studies, though, do not take into account the simultaneous
migrations that occurred northward during the latter half of the
nineteenth century. Here, it is important to underscore the
simultaneous process of migration and return migration, then and now,
before turning to the more concrete estimates of northward migration.
If we calculate the estimates by the United States Census Bureau
around 1910, or about six decades following the signing of the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1849, some estimates are that almost at a
13. See RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE LOS ANGELES BARRIO: A SOCIAL
HISTORY, 120 (1982).
14. See Phillip B. Gonzales, The Hispano Homeland Debate: New Lessons, 6
PERSPECTIVES IN MEXICAN AMERICAN STUDIES 123–141 (1997). For some numbers see Oscar
J. Martinez, On the Size of the Chicano Population: New Estimates 1850–1900, 1 AZTLÁN: J.
OF CHICANO STUDIES 43–67 (Spring 1975) (Martinez suggests that my lower range is his upper
range; however, if one takes into account hispanicized Indians, or Genizaros, the number is
conservatively closer to 250,000 so-called “Mexican citizens” in the ceded territories).
15. LUIS ABOITES AGUILAR, NORTE PRECARIO: POBLAMIENTO Y COLONIZACIÓN EN
MÉXICO, 1760-1940, (El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Históricos: Centro de
Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 1995) (Mex.).
16. MARK WYMAN, ROUND TRIP AMERICA: THE IMMIGRANTS RETURN TO EUROPE, 1880–
1930, 6 (1993).
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quarter million Mexicans were being counted by the census, which
needs to be factored into the equation.17 Migration and repatriation are
processes that happen simultaneously thereafter and therefore difficult
to calculate with any precision because of absence of institutions to
perform a census, statistical data, or more concrete evidence. Thus, the
number of Mexicanos that migrated south in the decades after the
Mexican War continues to generate debate accompanied by a variety
of conflicting numbers, but an estimate of 31,000, or around 25-30%
of the total Mexican population residing in what is today the US
Southwest may have returned.18
III. THE FIRST FEDERAL REPATRIATION COMMISSION AND ITS MISSION
Not long after the end of hostilities, the administration of José
Joaquin de Herrera issued a decree on August 19, 1848, addressing
“those Mexican families that are found in the United States and want
to emigrate to their patria.”19 Issued shortly after the important July 5
“Proyectos de Colonización,” the decree was considered an extension
of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo signed at the beginning of that

17. ARTHUR CORWIN, Early Mexican Labor Migration: A Frontier Sketch, 1848-1900, in
IMMIGRANTS—AND IMMIGRANTS: PERSPECTIVES ON MEXICAN LABOR MIGRATION TO THE
UNITED STATES 25–37 (Arthur F. Corwin ed., Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978); see also
JUAN GÓMEZ-QUIÑONES, Mexican Immigration to the United States, 1848-1980: An Overview,
in CHICANO STUDIES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 56–78 (Eugene E. Garcia, Francisco
A. Lomelí, and Isidro D. Ortíz, eds., New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University,
1984).
18. There are obviously debates about these numbers in the estimates for return
migration, and they stand in stark contrast to the primary estimates. For instance, William
Douglas Taylor, places the number at 3,000; however, he only cites the [Chihuahuan] study
undertaken by Martín González de La Vara (1994), and then only this one case. Douglas states
that: “Aunque no se sabe con exactitud el número de mexicanos que eventualmente se hayan
mudado a México, se calcula que alrededor de tres mil personas aceptaron la oferta y
volvieron” [“Even though the number of Mexicans who eventually moved to Mexico is not
exactly known, it is calculated that about three thousand people accepted the offered and
returned”]. See La Repatriación de Mexicanos de 1848 a 1980 y su papel en la colonización
de la región fronteriza septentrional de México, 69 RELACIONES 18, 198–212 (1997).
According to the First Repatriation Commission to New Mexico in early June 1848, Father
Ramón Ortiz estimated that in addition to the 900 families that had already signed up to help
found the colonies in Chihuahua, another 16,000 families totalling upwards of 53,000 souls
could migrate south if monies were set aside for this endeavour. An additional $1,653,342
pesos would be necessary if all of the potential repatriates opted to leave, or about $1,628,342
pesos more than the original $25,000 that was initially extended. See Correspondence of
Ramón Ortiz, in THREE NEW MEXICO CHRONICLES, 148–49; AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-132971.
19. Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 407–412.

HERNANDEZ - THE DECREE OF 19 AUGUST (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

6

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

8/11/2018 1:40 PM

[Vol. 33:1

year.20 All potential emigrants were free to make their own travel
arrangements, according to Article 9 of the Herrera Decree, but they
would still be obligated to notify the “commissioner at the time of
enlistment, in order to have him present when making out the
budget.”22 Twenty-five pesos would be allotted to each repatriate over
the age of fourteen, and twelve pesos for those thirteen and under.23 At
least on paper, local commissioners and state governments did their
best to place those potential repatriates in colonies where their skills
could be employed, especially agricultural and livestock specialists.24
The 1848 decree instituting the Repatriation Commission for the three
northern regions contains important stipulations that speak to a more
nuanced and accurate view of the period. Particularly telling are those
orders calling for preferential treatment of repatriates and the
distribution of authority for the repatriation project. Much like the
preferential treatment accorded the indigenes following Independence,
or those migrating north from the center of Mexico, Mexicans residing
in the “lost territory” were favored over foreign immigrants and other
military colonists. Article One of the decree states, “All of the
Mexicans found in the territory during the celebration of peace that,
because of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, remained in the power of
the United States of [the] North, and want to come and establish
themselves in that of the Republic, will be transferred to this one
[Mexico] on account of the treasury and in the form established in the
following articles.”25 The decree notably grants preferential treatment
to repatriates, one of the many hallmarks of repatriation policies as the
nineteenth century wore on.26
The benefits decreed for repatriates reflected a perception of these
returning migrants as ideal colonists that were now considered
20. Consisting of two dozen articles, this comprehensive repatriation decree addressed a
wide range of topics. These included: the composition of the commission, the states that
would accommodate repatriates, the particulars of the repatriates’ travel back to Mexico,
responsibilities and payments to repatriates, the salaries and duties of the commissioners, and
agreements with state and federal officials concerning land.
21. This article read as follows: “Artículo 22 de la ley de 14 de junio de 1848: “Queda
autorizado el Gobierno para invertir hasta doscientos mil pesos del fondo de que habla el
artículo 2º (el de indemnización que paguen los Estados Unidos) de esta ley en la traslación
de las familias mexicanas que no quieran permanecer en el territorio cedido a los Estados
Unidos y soliciten establecerse en la República. Esta cantidad podrá aumentarse con presencia
de los presupuestos respectivos, que el mismo Gobierno presentará al Congreso.” AHSRE,
supra note 4.
22. Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 407–412.
23. AHSRE, supra note 4.
24. Id.
25. Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 407–412.
26. Id.
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“modern” and therefore “civilized.” Their attraction came in part due
to the impression that they could fulfill the dual purposes of displacing
foreign colonists and maintain the northern colonies as military
outposts continuing their pacification of the indigenes of those regions.
Article 6 declares: “The Mexicans that emigrate in virtue of this decree
will have the right of preference so that all of the concessions that the
law establishes or had established in favor of foreign colonists will be
made to them.”27 Assistance would be extended to them in a “special
manner,” and they would receive preferential treatment in the Military
Colonies established by law on the 20 of July.28 Although foreigners
would still be allowed to settle in these colonies, an individual review
by the inspector of the colony was now required in each of these
cases.29
An abdication of federal authority to the states in the decree
presented a major difficulty for repatriates as questions about available
land and financial responsibilities were being articulated. Whereas the
central government desired to be the final authority on immigration
policy, the responsibility of providing for these migrants would
ultimately fall to the states. Article 7 states that “Governors of the
states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Sonora
and the primary political authority of Baja California, shall regulate by
law, in the part that corresponds to each of them, the organization of
the civil colonies that are to be founded by emigrants.”30 Land for the
colonies should come from “arrangements with large landowners, or
through whatever other means, that the emigrants find.”31 Article 22
ceded even more authority to the state Governors when it noted that
the Governors had final say in disputed matters. The federal
government assigned very significant responsibility to state officials
by stipulating that officials would negotiate with local hacendados to
secure land for the repatriates. The ongoing struggle to disintegrate
the hacendado system was certainly part of the story behind the weak
concentration of settlement in the north, further complicating the
possibility of a well ordered repatriation program.32 In the end—and
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 400–07 (Articulo 24 of “Decreto de 19
de Julio de 1848, y Reglamento expedido el día 20 del mismo mes, para el establecimiento de
colonias militares en la nueva línea divisoria con los Estados Unidos de América”).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Jan de Vos, Una legislación de graves consecuencias: El acaparamiento de tierras
baldías en México, con el pretexto de colonización, 1821-1910, 34 HISTORIA MEXICANA 76–
113 (1984) (Mex.).
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even as some argued that repatriates would help fragment the
hacendado stranglehold—most large landowners did very little to
make land available for repatriates, or any other settlers for that
matter.33 Simultaneously, various northern states provided lands and
other incentives for repatriation before, during, and after the passage
of the August 19, 1848 Decree—in many cases simply repopulating
smaller towns along the border, as in the cases of modern day Tijuana,
Baja California; Piedras Negras, Coahuila; and Ciudad Juarez,
Chihuahua.34
IV. APPOINTMENT OF THE COMMISSIONERS IN NEW MEXICO
The decree in question was implemented through the appointment
of three Repatriation Commissions appointed to each of the three
frontier regions.35 Article 3 specified that “three commissioners were
to arrange the migrations. Mexicans in Alta California were to receive
land in Baja California or Sonora; those in New Mexico, land in
Chihuahua; and Texas Mexicans, land in Tamaulipas, Coahuila or
Nuevo León.”36 I would suggest that the repatriation operation should
be located within a continuum of the postwar military realignment of
the northern frontier as a whole since the tripartite schema was simply
amalgamated to the newly formed Repatriation Commission.
Repatriation policies, at least during the mid nineteenth century, were
co-opted as military policies that included the pacification of the
frontier, only this time with returning colonists.37 Despite the fact that
the decree made a concerted effort to treat the repatriation of those
military zones as a whole, the commissions were established at
different times, under different circumstances, with different levels of
investment, and they each ultimately met with differing levels of
settlement and therefore “success.” In the western territory of Baja
California, for instance, the governor of that state appears to have taken
the lead in the designation of a Repatriate Commissioner with the
33. Holden points out that such practices, at least in terms of claiming public lands
(baldios) would under the presidency of Benito Juárez as the Ley sobre Ocupación y
Enajenación de Terrenos Baldíos (1863), but that the rush for public lands commenced during
the Porfiriato. See ROBERT H. HOLDEN, MEXICO AND THE SURVEY OF PUBLIC LANDS: THE
MANAGEMENT OF MODERNIZATION, 1876-1911, 3–24 (1994).
34. HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 7, at 137–162.
35. Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 407-412.
36. THOMAS EWING COTNER, THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL CAREER OF JOSE JOAQUIN DE
HERRERA, 1792-1854, 268–69 (1949); quoted in DAVID J. WEBER, FOREIGNERS IN THEIR
NATIVE LAND: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE MEXICAN AMERICANS, 141–44 (1973).
37. José Angel Hernández, Contemporary Deportation Raids and Historical Memory:
Mexican Expulsions in the Nineteenth Century, 52:2 AZTLÁN: J. OF CHICANO STUDIES 115–
141 (2010).
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appointment of Jesús Islas in 1856.38 Islas had stimulated a “Back to
Mexico” movement only a few years earlier, but later was implicated
in a filibustering expedition.39 In the Eastern provinces, Don Rafael De
La Garza, a former treasurer for the state of Nuevo León was appointed
as the Commissioner to repatriate Mexican families to Tamaulipas. In
1850 he declined this job offer from the central government.40 The case
of New Mexico, when compared to Texas and California, had a
categorically diverging historical experience due primarily to the
demographic positionality of the region.
New Mexico, the state with largest Mexican population, proved
to be the most fruitful area for attracting repatriates. The territory, then
known as Nuevo Mejico, was naturally targeted for repatriation and
Father Ortiz, a leading politician, priest, and known patriot, was
appointed to serve as its first representative.41 The appointment of
Father Ortiz as the first commissioner in charge of repatriating
Mexican families from New Mexico was initially without incident—
at least until he began to encourage the mass repatriation of Nuevo
Mexicanos immediately following the war and allegedly violating
some of the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.42 When Ortiz
arrived in the county of Lerdo, New Mexico—where the general
opinion of U.S. officials was that only a small portion of the local
population wished to return to Mexico— Ortiz notes that “the
inhabitants enthusiastically presented themselves to me, asking that
they be enlisted with their families in order to pass to Mexican
territory.”43 Father Ortiz was by his own account received positively
wherever he went while serving as commissioner up until 1853.44 It
was precisely along the border where most of the repatriation activity
would eventually take place, and he found no lack of interest on the
38. Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 607–612.
39. In my own research of these Repatriate Commissions, I found very little evidence to
suggest that a commissioner was ever appointed for Baja California. It was not until 1855 that
Jesús Islas was appointed to the post. Instead what one reads is an active Governor involved
in the repatriation efforts, but only to a limited degree. I would argue that the formation of
repatriate societies in California after 1849 is a phenomenon that questions the limits of state
efforts to repatriate after the war. See Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 607–612
(“Disposición de 13 de Febrero de 1856: Promoviendo la emigración de la raza hispanoamericana existente en la Alta California, para aprovecharla en la colonización del Estado de
Sonora”). This letter and four-point suggestion was also published in the 1856 publication of
“Ministerio de Fomento,” 10 Mayo 1856.
40. AHSRE supra note 4, at 2-13-1974.
41. Id. at 2-13-2971.
42. Id.
43. Id. at L-E-1975 (XXV); see English translation of letter in THREE NEW MEXICO
CHRONICLES, 144–145; see also AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2971.
44. Id.
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part of residents. Would-be repatriates in the area eagerly approached
the commissioner to have their names placed on the list to migrate to
Chihuahua. In one of his first letters to the Minister of Foreign
Relations reporting on the conditions in El Paso Del Norte, Ortiz
signals both the enterprise’s problems and its promise, i.e., the
possibility of repatriating thousands of Nuevomexicanos.45 But worthy
of note are his references to the kinds of individuals interested in this
proposition. According to Ortiz,
To fulfil the commission that the Supreme Government
has seen fit to honor me with, I find myself, after having
surpassed the various obstacles that I have had to
overcome, at the door of New Mexico, and even before
entering I have the satisfaction of announcing to His
Excellency that I have received about twenty distinct
requests from middle class families to transfer to the
territory of the Republic, and that according to the news
arriving consistently from the nationals of that country,
and according to foreigners that have recently arrived
from the same, there should be at least from two to four
thousand families disposed to emigrate, yet even
though this news favors the generous desires of the
Supreme Government of the Nation, it is accompanied
by insurmountable obstacles for the emigration to occur
this coming Spring.46
In this initial report Ortiz clearly indicates that the vast majority
of potential repatriates would not be taken from the middle class, but
rather from families with more limited means: “twenty requests were
made by middle-class families while another potential two to four
thousand families were prepared to move south with the Repatriate
Commission.”47 Depending on whether we accept the two thousand or
four thousand figures, the middle classes here constitute a mere
percentage of the interested parties. What remains clear is that the visit
45. Id. at L-E- 1975 (XXV), f. 135-137. Original: “Para cumplir con la comisión con que
el Supremo Gobierno se sirvió honrarme me hallo ya apenas de los diversos obstáculos que he
tenido que vencer a las puertas de Nuevo México y aun antes de entrar tengo la satisfacción
de anunciar a V. E. que he recibido ya como veinte solicitudes distintas de familias de la clase
media para pasar al territorio de la República y que según las noticias uniformes de nacionales
de aquel país y extranjeros que recientemente han venido del mismo, debe haber lo menos de
dos a cuatro mil familias dispuestas a emigrar, pero aunque esta noticia es tan favorable a los
generosos deseos del Gobierno Supremo de la Nación, se presentan con todo obstáculos
insuperables para que la emigración pueda ser en la próxima primavera.”
46. Id.
47. Id.
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from the Repatriate Commission generated interest among the least
fortunate, or those without lands in the New Mexico Territory.
It also appears that for many repatriates, the decision to follow the
new political boundaries of Mexico southward was a doubtful
negation, in other words, a choice favoring the lesser of two evils.
Early repatriates exhibited doubts about whether their rights would be
respected as subjects of the US if they stayed in place, or to take their
chances with a government seemingly in chaos and revolutions. In a
letter to the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Governor of the state
of Chihuahua, Ortiz explains that those of El Vado County receptive
to repatriation “were willing to lose everything rather than to live in a
country whose government gave them fewer guarantees than our own
and in which they were treated with more disdain than members of the
African race.”48 According to Ortiz, New Mexicans feared that, under
a U.S. system of governance, they would be treated as second-class
citizens.49 But as most of the literature illustrates for the nineteenth
century Mexican American experience in the southwest, the vast
majority of Nuevomexicanos opted to remain in place and hence under
a US system of government. Moreover, the experience of
Nuevomexicanos, despite these early and eerie warnings, partook of
an experience that was fundamentally distinct from so-called members
of the “African race.”
Although Ortiz’ initial assessment of the prospects for
repatriation was generally positive, he stressed the need for more
money to offset these unforeseen circumstances having to do with the
war and the unforeseen winter weather. Indeed, if one were to weave
a petate, one of the many threads throughout the archival record is the
states’ lack of funding, which is not without merit. The desire and
demand, one could suggest, were in place at this time, but the monies
were not, thus lessening the potential impact of return migration. Thus,
like many others during the era, Father Ramon Ortiz made a dramatic
appeal to the government of Mexico, sympathetically noting that the
situation “makes one feel the hunger of those pueblos and this calamity
will be a destructive beating to them after four months.”50 Regardless
of whether Ortiz saw these conditions as a liability or potentially a
strategic advantage for recruitment, from the perspective of repatriates,
the decision to continue in colonies was perhaps tied as much to
questions of survival than loyalty to the Mexican state. In the balance
48. Id. at 135–37.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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was Ortiz’ standing as saviour or scapegoat. In the end, the vast
majority of Nuevomexicanos stayed in place, while perhaps 25-30%
may have returned in the four decades following the Mexican
American war.51
V. ISSUES WITH FUNDING AND FAVORITISM
As already described, the desire to repatriate was much stronger
than initially expected. It is not surprising, then, that the original
amount of money allotted for repatriation was but a fraction of what
Ortiz predicted for resettlement.52 The problems associated with
finances, favoritism, and the cronyism of regional politics contributed
to the early problems with repatriation, not to mention efforts by the
US government to prevent the repatriation/depopulation of New
Mexico after 1848.
The reassignment of Ortiz from a national to a state-level
commission may indicate that the federal government to some extent
abandoned repatriation efforts after U.S. authorities challenged the
Repatriation Commission. But the cost of this enterprise must certainly
have been daunting to federal officials with perennially empty coffers.
During his trip in the spring of 1849, the priest Ramón Ortiz indicated
to the Ministry of Foreign Relations that he would need a great deal
more than the first payment of $25,000 pesos.53 According to his
calculations in early June of that year, Ortiz estimated that in addition
to the 900 families that had already signed up to help found the
colonies in Chihuahua, another 16,000 families totalling upwards of
53,000 souls could migrate south if monies were set aside for this
endeavour.54 An additional $1,653,342 pesos would be necessary if all
of the potential repatriates opted to leave, or about $1,628,342 pesos
more than the original $25,000 that was initially extended.55 Around
92,000 fanegas of corn and almost 25,000 fanegas of beans, roughly
an eight-month supply of food would be needed until the colonies
could become self-sufficient.56 Accounting by the government of
Chihuahua showed Ortiz as being at a deficit of almost $3,000 by the
51. GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra note 13, at 120.
52. Ortiz was estimating that the total costs of repatriation would entail some $1,653,342
pesos for all the potential migrants.
53. Martín González de la Vara, The Return to Mexico: the relocation of New Mexican
families in Chihuahua and the conformation of a border region, in THE CONTESTED
HOMELAND: A CHICANO HISTORY OF NEW MEXICO 1848-1854, 50 (2000).
54. AHSRE, supra note 4.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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end of 1850. He had spent $39,110 pesos since the start of his mission,
and various governmental officials and agencies had already
forwarded around $36,167 pesos.57
The government acknowledged that funding for repatriation was
an ongoing problem, and that it may have had an effect on where
individuals chose to live after the war. The Memoria submitted to the
Chamber of Deputies in 1851 addressed this matter somewhat vaguely
in its 43-page report in the following way: “Transfer of Mexican
families: The government has given some quantities more for this
object and has the satisfaction of announcing that there have already
been formed in the territory of the Republic, new populations
composed in their larger part by Mexicans that have emigrated from
the lands given by the last treaty to the United States of the North. I
should mention here that Don Gregorio Mier y Terán graciously ceded
some lands for this object. The government believes that if it had been
able to dispose of larger sums, the number of those that would have
transferred to Mexico would have been greater.”58 The use of “some
additional amounts” really means a total of a few thousand pesos and
not more than 1% of the $15,000,000 the U.S. government provided
for the lands ceded to them after the war.59 Given the postwar
environment, foreign interventions, the Wars of Reform, a depleted
treasury, and the continued war against “Indios Bárbaros,” perhaps
more pressing concerns impeded such altruistic policies.
VI. THE LEGAL ARGUMENT IN U.S. OPPOSITION TO REPATRIATION
Opposition to Ortiz, or to his leadership of the first repatriation
campaigns, did not deter ongoing efforts at repatriation by the national
government or state governments across the new International
Boundary. The repatriation of Mexican nationals to the state of
Chihuahua did not end with this first Repatriation Commission, but
instead it became a state-level initiative thereafter.60 The states of
Sonora, Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas each
did their part to encourage and in some cases implement repatriation
initiatives on their own, and each with their own regional
particularities, too numerous to mention here. Ortiz resolved to try
other avenues that encouraged return migration, as federal efforts were
57. AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2977.
58. Memoria del Ministro de Relaciones Interiores y Esteriores Leída en las Cámaras en
1851, 29 (México: Imprenta de Vicente García Torres, 1851) (Mex.).
59. Id.
60. González de la Vara, supra note 53, at 9–21.

HERNANDEZ - THE DECREE OF 19 AUGUST (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

14

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

8/11/2018 1:40 PM

[Vol. 33:1

thwarted and subsequently suspended.61 Where he was removed from
New Mexico for encouraging repatriation, he was now being hired by
the Government of Chihuahua to receive and settle those repatriates
that had crossed into Mexican territory.62
After Ortiz’ initial visit to El Vado, he moved on to La Cañada
County, only to be forced to desist when the Military Governor of the
Territory, Donaciano Vigil, prohibited the recruitment of repatriates.
According to Ortiz, “The first day I was there about to enlist more than
one hundred heads of families, who had appeared before me in
compliance with the decree dated August 19, 1848, I received an
official letter from the Governor of the territory. In it, with the excuse
that the gathering was disturbing the peace, he prohibited my
appearing personally in the settlements of the territory.”63 In no
uncertain terms Vigil made it clear that he would not permit “[Ortiz]
personally to visit the different points of this territory for the purpose
of setting forth [his] commission to the settlers.”64 With the backing of
U.S. military officials, Vigil claimed Ortiz had “acted beyond” his
“official capacity by making promises which are too extensive and
which arouse a great deal of commotion,” among the potential
repatriates.65 These accusations of “disturbing the peace” were not
completely off the mark. Ortiz was known to harbor anti-American
sentiments, which had in part led to his appointment as commissioner
in the first place. Vigil thus prohibited Ortiz from appearing personally
in any of the towns, thus putting an end to his Commission, at least at
the federal level.
Vigil, according to Ortiz, prohibited the repatriation of Mexicans
from the territory “under the pretext that the disturbance was growing
even in the capital and that he had received complaints from all the
prefects in which they said that from the time of my arrival in the
territory all the settlements had openly refused to obey them.”66 When
Ortiz protested in face-to-face interviews with Vigil, the latter argued
that Ortiz was inciting disturbances of the sort he had organized after
the signing the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.67 Ortiz emerges as a
61. AHSRE, supra note 4.
62. González de la Vara, supra note 53, at 9–21.
63. AHSRE, supra note 4.
64. Id.
65. Letter from Donaciano Vigil to Ramón Ortiz, THREE NEW MEXICO CHRONICLES 149
(Apr. 29, 1849).
66. Id.
67. Correspondence of Ramón Ortiz, THREE NEW MEXICO CHRONICLES, 144–49; see
AHSRE, supra note 4, at L-E-1975 (XXV); see also AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2971.
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figure caught between his regional loyalty to the territories of the north,
his patriotic sentiments toward the Mexican government, and his
concern for a repatriate population more interested in pragmatic
concerns than ideology.
Some in Washington, D.C. echoing the concerns expressed by
some local officials interpreted the repatriation of New Mexicans to
Chihuahua as counterproductive to the normalization of relations
between the U.S. and Mexico and a violation of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo.68 Vigil’s affronts to repatriation efforts echoed a
broader set of arguments that appealed directly to at least two
interpretations of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and thus reflected
the still fresh wounds of battles over national sovereignty and border
territory. The past of Father Ramón Ortiz, integral to this history, also
became a factor in the way repatriation efforts would play out, and US
officials had plenty of intelligence to justify their concerns. Strictly
speaking, the repatriation of the population of Mexican origin was not
part of the agreement reached on February of 1848 when both nations
came together to sign the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The U.S.
Secretary of War, George W. Cranford pointed out to the Mexican
Minister of Foreign Relations that “it is not perceived, examining the
material, that Mexico has acquired any right, not even when it can be
inferred that it possess it, to entice those inhabitants in the ceded
territories to emigrate and conserve their citizenship returning to
establish themselves within Mexican territory.”69 The treaty excluded
the possibility of repatriation and consequently, so the argument went,
the entry of a foreign representative such as Ortiz into New Mexico to
encourage repatriation was prohibited. This unauthorized travel to
depopulate a region of its inhabitants could then be framed in stark
terms as an “invasion” in violation of the treaty. In a remarkable
political move, reminiscent of the Encomienda system of Spanish past,
here the Treaty was interpreted to include not only the physical
landscape, but also extended to the inhabitants of the ceded territories,
the very population leading the charge against the native indigenes
laying claim to the western territories.
VII. A FEW OF THE NEW MEXICO TOWNS, BRIEFLY…
In April of 1849 a small group of 2500 settlers were already
occupying the area which would become the Colonia “Guadalupe de
los Nobles,” and successive waves of repatriates would foster
68. Id.
69. AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2971.
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resentment and competition for land in the years to come.70 New
arrivals are always treated with resentment by earlier colonists.
Resentment and competition between first settlers and later colonists
is a universally well-known source of social conflict, and the
distinctions can become harsher when these particularities are being
resolved along a violent and volatile frontier. These first settlers had
“emigrated from the towns of Senecú, Ysleta, and San Elizario”—
locations and settlements that had been part of Chihuahua prior to the
U.S. occupation.71 Although the commissioner articulated an objection
to preferential treatment, the very material promises of the decrees
undermine such a caveat. In his study of contemporary rural violence
in Mexico, Sociologist Andrés Villarreal believes that “because the
loss of land, or loss of good quality land, has a direct impact on the
livelihood of the peasant and may indeed be life-threatening, conflict
over land may be expected to turn more violent.”72 Favoritism and
extortion, whether real or imagined, emerged as a constant theme in
almost every repatriate colony that I examined. Gregorio Gándara, the
commissioner of emigration from the border town of San Elizario,
stipulated that the emigrants from just across the river should be treated
the same as those coming from further away in New Mexico, and the
need to underscore this apparent consideration only evidences the
tension.73
By April of 1850, it is estimated that six hundred families from
New Mexico had migrated to the colonies of Guadalupe and San
Ignacio.74 Governor Frías noted in the middle of March that migrants
were arriving at the border towns of San Elizario and Isleta every day,
and that more were to be expected. Frías estimated that “[t]wo
thousand five hundred people to date exist in the colony of Guadalupe
of those that have emigrated from New Mexico and of the towns of
San Elizario, Socorro and Isleta belonging to this Villa; and new
emigrants are arriving most of the days.”75 Two years later the
population of Guadalupe appears at 1,015 individuals, while that of

70. Id. at 2-13-2977.
71. Samuel E. Sisneros, Los emigrantes nuevomexicanos: The 1849 repatriation to
Guadalupe and San Ignacio, Chihuahua, Mexico, 46–54 (Dec. 2001) (unpublished M.A.
thesis,
University
of
Texas
at
El
Paso)
(on
file
at
https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/dissertations/AAIEP05556).
72. See The Social Ecology of Rural Violence: Land Scarcity, the Organization of
Agricultural Production, and the Presence of the State, 110:2 AMERICAN J. OF SOCIOLOGY
313–348 (Sep. 2004).
73. Sisneros, supra note 71.
74. AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2977.
75. Id.

HERNANDEZ - THE DECREE OF 19 AUGUST (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

THE DECREE OF 19 OF AUGUST 1848

8/11/2018 1:40 PM

17

San Ignacio was at 232. Of this total, upwards of 550 colonists had
come from the New Mexico Territory to these two colonies, according
to the 1852 census, and per the analysis provided by Samuel Sisneros.76
The preferential treatment of migrants from right across the river
would serve to fuel internal tensions between earlier and newly arrived
migrants. The early settlers were the keenest to secure better lands, the
most abundant watering holes, and other advantages. The division
between earlier and later settlers is universal, and as such social
divisions within these colonies were transferred to the new locales and
further complicated by successive waves of settlement.
VIII. REPATRIATIONS FROM TEXAS
The repatriation of the Mexican population in the region of Texas
and Louisiana began in 1831 and experienced substantial increase with
the many expulsions that occurred after so-called “Texas
Independence” in 1835.77 The towns of Piedras Negras, Coahuila, and
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas were also founded immediately following
the war, and several locales in Coahuila would become the sites of
repatriation as the century came to a close.78 Sociologist Davíd
Montejano notes there was “considerable repatriation after the
Mexican War,” in which “refugees” moved across the Rio Grande and
settled “among the old established towns of El Paso del Norte,
Guerrero, Mier, Camargo, Reynosa, and Matamoros.”79 Throughout
the rest of the nineteenth century other important towns were founded
and grew just across the new border, towns such as Nuevo Monterrey,
Tamaulipas (now Nuevo Laredo), Piedras Negras, San Diego, San
Juan, Palo Blanco, Agua Dulce, El Sauz, Los Olmos, San Luis,
Pansacola, Zapata, San Ignacio, and Los Saenz.80

76. Sisneros, supra note 71, at 158.
77. José Angel Hernández, Mexican Expulsions & Indian Removal during the Early
Period of Global Mass Immigrations, 30 WORLD HISTORY BULLETIN 30–34 (Jared Poley ed.,
2014).
78. Otto Schober, Breve historia de Piedras Negras, PIEDRAS NEGRAS,
http://www.piedrasnegras.gob.mx/contenido05/conoce-pn/historia/ (last visited May 10,
2018).
79. DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836–1986,
30 (2009).
80. Arnoldo De León, Life for Mexicans in Texas after the 1836 Revolution, in MAJOR
PROBLEMS IN MEXICAN AMERICAN HISTORY 167–175 (Zaragoza Vargas ed. 1999). The total
number of towns founded or repopulated after the war requires an amount of detailed research
that is not always easily accessible. Indeed, one way in which to analyze this phenomenon
would be for a research team to identify, quantify, and analyze the number of settlements
established along the Mexican frontiers during and in the years following the war.
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Many of the repatriates resettled in towns that were already well
established and oftentimes right across the new international boundary,
as in the case of Piedras Negras, Coahuila (A.K.A Ciudad Porfirio
Díaz), which today sits across the border from Eagle Pass, Texas.81
Because of its close proximity, it was obviously a notable repatriate
destination. A local historian mentions that 34 repatriates arrived on
June 15, 1850 to settle in what was then called “Colonia Militar de
Guerrero en Piedras Negras.”82 Five years later, this settlement lost its
military character and became an ordinary “civilian” outpost named
simply “Piedras Negras.” The population of Piedras Negras these days
numbers around a quarter of a million citizens in the larger
metropolitan area and constitutes its own city and municipality.83
Today, the city of Piedras Negras generates millions of dollars in
revenue as a major port of entry between the US and Mexico.84 A
similar phenomenon has taken place in the case of Nuevo Laredo,
Tamaulipas—also one of the most important trade routes between the
United States—which we turn to now.
Directly across the border (and river) from Laredo, Texas, the
border town of Nuevo Laredo still holds celebrations that hearken to
its foundational 1848 repatriations. On the surface, it appears
repatriation across the new international boundary in this locale took
place uneventfully, but this state of affairs should be both scrutinized
more closely and placed within the broader context of postwar
repatriation as a whole. Archival evidence exists that money and land
were provided to support repatriation to Nuevo Laredo (known then as
“La Colonia Civil in el Rio Salado”) and also to the town of Mier in
neighboring Coahuila.85 According to some sources, the Governor of
Tamaulipas wrote to the Minister of Foreign Relations to “receive and
distribute the ten thousand three hundred and seventy-nine pesos
destined for the Supreme Government for the aid of 502 individuals
81. CARLOS FLORES REVUELTA AND ÁLVARO CANALES SANTOS, PIEDRAS NEGRAS:
RESEÑA HISTÓRICA, PROTAGONISTAS, (Saltillo: Club del Libro Coahuilense, Editora el Dos,
2004) (Mex.).
82. Schober, supra note 78.
83. For Piedras Negras population statistics, see the Official Government Website,
http://www.piedrasnegras.gob.mx/2010/06/historia/.
84. For Piedras Negras economic and trade statistics, see Instituto Nacional de
Estadistíca y Geografía [National Institute of Statistics and Geography],
http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/app/areasgeograficas/?ag=05#.
85. Carta de Gobernador de Tamaulipas a Ministro de Relaciones Interiores y
Exteriores, 15 Abril 1850, AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2976, “El gobernador de Tamaulipas
pide se nombre al comisionado que haya de entenderse con la traslación de familias que
soliciten venir a México y que vivido en E.U. de A. De acuerdo con el Tratado de Guadalupe,
1850.”
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from Laredo that should form a colony on the land ceded for this
purpose by Don Gregorio de Mier y Terán,” i.e., the area of modern
day Nuevo Laredo.86 Some records also exist pertaining to the
establishment of the town of Mier in modern day Coahuila (then a part
of the state of Tamaulipas). Fifty families “left in the territories ceded
to the United States of America” were granted lands close to the town
of “Villa de Mier, according to the Governor of Tamaulipas.”87 The
founding of Nuevo Laredo and Mier are remarkable grassroots efforts
considering that they occurred without the benefit of a government
representative leading the effort. The relative ease with which the local
population and the government could align in this case of repatriation
was probably also due to its geographical proximity right across the
new international boundary. In Laredo, repatriates need only to
transfer their belongings to the opposite side of the river. One must
also consider other, better-recorded cases in which repatriation did not
appear to proceed nearly as smoothly, as was the case of El Remolino
in the neighboring state of Coahuila.
The 1850 repatriation of 618 individuals from Nacogdoches,
Texas to El Remolino, Coahuila, approximately 150 kilometers away,
presents an interesting test case for gauging the Mexican government’s
commitment to the cause of repatriation. The repatriation from
Nacogdoches was shaped largely from the problematic execution of
appointing a Repatriation Commissioner for the eastern provinces.
There was no government champion to spearhead the effort for the case
of Texas as there was with Father Ramon Ortiz in New Mexico. In the
end, the success of repatriation over this considerable distance relied
much more on local intervention than the economic and political
support of government authorities. Without being blind to a certain
amount of self-interest in colonization, the relative success of the case
of El Remolino seems to have rested largely on the shoulders of a
prominent local official: Antonio Menchaca. Menchaca composed a
list that provides the bare facts of the Nacogdoches to El Remolino
repatriation.88 From the archival record, we learn that two hundred

86. AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2974. Don Gregorio de Mier y Terán is probably one
of the few individuals that donated a substantial amount of his land for repatriate colonization.
87. Id. at 2-13-2976.
88. Id. at 2-13-2975, “El Gobernador de Coahuila acompañando una solicitud de Don
Antonio Menchaca vecino de Nacogdoches para trasladar a la República familias mexicanas.
Se nombra comisionado al Gobernador de Nuevo León, 1850.” (Nominal list of Mexican
families from Nacogdoches who remained on territory transferred to the United States in the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and due to said treaties and the Decree of August 19, 1848, are
conceded the right to transport themselves in Mexican territory).
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families intended to settle in El Remolino.89 The total number of
persons was 618, and 146 of these were under the age of 14, while the
remaining 472 were over the age of 14. Only three female heads of
household were listed by Menchaca in his correspondence with
officials in Coahuila and Mexico City.
Unlike the relatively successful cases of repatriations from New
Mexico and perhaps California, the appointment of a Repatriation
Commission for the Eastern Provinces ended in temporary disarray
when the nominee, José Rafael De La Garza, rejected his appointment.
Among the several candidates proposed initially was José María
Carvajal, who years later would be accused of fraud and going beyond
his jurisdiction by attempting to extend land grants to friends and
cronies.90 De La Garza was the ultimate choice for commissioner and
it was specified that “the quantity of ten thousand three hundred and
seventy-nine pesos” should be allotted to him for the repatriation of
individuals to Nuevo León if he were eventually named as Repatriate
Commissioner for the region.91 Unfortunately for the officials in
Mexico City, De La Garza declined his appointment that fall because
of his current employment and other personal business matters. In his
response to the officials, De La Garza stated: “I can barely and badly
attend to [my own affairs] because of my public [obligations].”92
Feeling overburdened, he resisted taking on any additional public
duties and commented that “[M]y employment as Chief Treasurer of
this State absorbs all of my attention, [and] my responsibility toward
the same State and the circumstances of my private business would
interfere with the work of the Repatriate Commission.”93 This rejection
would later be made public to Mr. Menchaca of the Remolino
repatriation, but not for another few months.
The frustrations of Antonio Menchaca with respect to repatriation
along the Texas border typified the kinds of relations that often
developed between local officials and the central Mexican government
in such efforts. Menchaca was still unaware that De La Garza had
89. Id.
90. See CIUDAD JUAREZ MUNICIPAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM COLLECTION, microformed on
MF513, Pt. 2, Reel 38; quoted in Samuel E. Sisneros, An Annotated List of Documents on the
Towns of Guadalupe and San Ignacio in the Ciudad Juarez Municipal Archives, 1849-1859,
GUIDES
TO
MICROFILM
COLLECTION
(Jan.
14,
2000),
https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&http
sredir=1&article=1000&context=guides.
91. Nombramiento para comisionado en Matamoros, hecho en Don Rafael de la Garza,
Tesorero General. Del Estado de Nuevo León, 1850, AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2974.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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turned down the position of Commissioner and therefore went to the
port of Matamoros in hopes of speaking with him in person. There he
contacted the Mexican Consulate in Brownsville about De La Garza
and ended up waiting three months for information about his
whereabouts and the agency charged with repatriation.94 Menchaca
was finally able to meet with De La Garza in late November, only to
be shown a copy of the letter in which the appointee had formally (and
respectfully) declined his appointment as Repatriation Commissioner
for the region.95 Oddly enough, neither Menchaca nor the Consulate in
Brownsville was ever informed through official channels of De La
Garza’s rejection of the appointment. This lack of communication and
other problems must surely have frustrated Menchaca and the
hundreds of repatriates waiting to resettle across the border in the
postwar environment. At first it seemed as though government
officials in Mexico City and the Foreign Ministry were warm to the
mutual benefits of repatriating experienced frontiersmen as settlers of
the northern frontiers. Only later when money became a factor did
national interest waver, and patriotism as well. Menchaca invested a
total of fourteen months traveling and petitioning the government for
a Repatriation Commission to assist him in a serious case of postwar
repatriation in the mid nineteenth century.
Some thirty-eight months after Menchaca composed his nominal
list, the number of repatriates and their families remained unchanged
when Menchaca billed the federal government $20,632 pesos. He
broke down his expenditures in the following manner: $1,752 for the
146 persons under the age of 14 (allotted $12 each) and $11,800 for
the 472 persons over the age of 14 (allotted $25 each). 96 To this
Menchaca added $7,080 pesos in unforeseen expenses as he financed
and led this particular repatriation project toward the state of
Coahuila.97 The Ministry of Foreign Relations responded to
Menchaca’s request by saying that due to the “scantiness of the
treasury” the government was currently not in a position to “make the
proposed expenditure.”98 This kind of exchange typified relations
between repatriates and advocates following the Mexican American
War of 1846-1848. The government response in this and many other
94. Id. at 2-13-2975.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2-13-2974.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2-13-2975; see also Sobre el establecimiento de 200 familias emigradas de
Bejar en el punto del Remolino en Coahuila (1850), Expediente 1819, Vol. SLVI, SALTILLO
ARCHIVES, CENTER FOR AMERICAN HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 93–127
[hereinafter SACAH].

HERNANDEZ - THE DECREE OF 19 AUGUST (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

22

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

8/11/2018 1:40 PM

[Vol. 33:1

cases, though, is near universal: there is no money, but there is land.
On various occasions, Menchaca attempted to use the power of
the pen and a varied arsenal of arguments to solicit help from relevant
authorities. In correspondence with the President of Mexico,
Menchaca minced no words, describing the De La Garza appointment
as “illusory” and insisting that Herrera’s government comply with the
laws already on the books.99 Presumably this was a reference to the
Decree of August 19, 1848, which “while being of use for the nation,
also alleviates [the] misfortunate [emigrants].”100 Menchaca also wrote
to the Governor of Coahuila, Rafael De La Fuente. From this
correspondence we learn that Menchaca was aware of the Nuevo
Laredo repatriation a few months earlier, and he could use the case to
good advantage as a precedent. He described it as an “identical case
that presented itself this year, regarding the emigration and
establishment of the colony of Mier y Terán by Mexican families from
Laredo.”101 In addition to being fair, a repatriation colony was due in
order to “fulfill the aims of unfortunate Mexicans [and] to ease their
difficult situation” and to realize the “noble and patriotic objectives”
of the Repatriation Commission. This feat would engender “undying
gratitude toward the sponsors,” argued Menchaca, if only the Mexican
government would respond in the positive, and according to the law. 102
It appears that not only the repatriates themselves, but apparently a
number of border governors as well, believed that the Mexican
government had an obligation to its citizens now left in the ceded
territories.
De La Fuente jointly took up the cause with Menchaca and relied
similarly on notions of precedent, fairness, humanitarian concern,
patriotism, and pragmatic grounds. On behalf of Menchaca, De La
Fuente composed a pointed appeal to the Minister of Foreign Relations
in May of 1851 that included material culled from Menchaca’s
correspondence. Menchaca asked, “[I]f Nuevo León [Laredo] was
granted ten thousand pesos to transfer the neighbors of Laredo to a new
colony inside its jurisdiction, should Coahuila be denied equal
grace?”103 Monies gained from the Treaty, he argued, should rightly be
applied toward the welfare of patriotic individuals who only
circumstantially found themselves across the border from their

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

AHSRE, supra note 4, at 2-13-2975.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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homeland.104 This government of Coahuila,” began De La Fuente, “did
not doubt the patriotic sentiments of the national government in
rescuing and assisting the return of Mexico’s sons back to the
homeland.” Referring to the value of the lands lost after the Mexican
American war, he went on to say:
[T]hat this immense loss has not been reimbursed by the
federation even though it be a considerable part of the land given to
the neighboring Republic, and for which was reimbursed to the Nation
the sum of fifteen million pesos; that for these circumstances the sons
of Coahuila are entitled to be aided with preference in the necessary
expenses for their adjournment to the territory of the Republic.105
Like much of the documentation of the period relating to
repatriation and colonization, practical concerns are also glossed over
with the moral patina of national belonging and postwar suffering. But
such appeals were usually met with responses of scant treasuries and
its accompanying discourse of “administrative disorder.” Appealing
to the nation’s sense of suffering and oppression, Menchaca
maintained that Mexico should “transfer to her bosom the unfortunates
that reside in Texas today reporting as Mexicans the injustices of the
proud Americans that, with weapons in hand, required and obtained
from Mexico those fertile lands.”106 At the very least, argued the
Governor of Nuevo Leon, the government should do everything in its
power “to rescue the unhappy Mexicans that by virtue of the treaty of
Guadalupe remained foreigners in their own land, and of the
misfortunes that afflict them.”107 In short order, the monies granted to
the nation via the stipulations of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo should be applied to the very victims that had suffered the loss
of land, namely the now fractured state of Coahuila y Tejas.
The back-and-forth between the federal government and state
officials endured for eight years and tested the patience of Menchaca
and the Governor of the state of Coahuila. For years to come the Diario
Oficial de Coahuila and various newspapers would continue to publish
advertisements promising government support for the repatriation of
Mexicans to the state.108 But repatriates also grew tired of waiting, and
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. “El Gobernador de Coahuila acompañando una solicitud de Don Antonio
Menchaca vecino de Nacogdoches para trasladar a la República familias mexicanas. Se
nombra comisionado al Gobernador de Nuevo León, 1850.”
107. Id.
108. SACAH, supra note 98.
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many decided to deal with administrative matters at a later date. Some
matters were in fact never resolved. In other cases, as with the
repatriation of La Ascensión, Chihuahua, land titles were issued more
than a decade later, though this did not end controversy over land
matters.109
Although little government aid came forward to contribute to the
formation of this settlement, the repatriate colony of El Remolino,
Coahuila would return to Mexico under difficult conditions and
circumstances. Part of these conditions were motivated by the
governments desire to populate the northern regions with loyal citizens
to fight off “Indios Bárbaros”; to serve as a buffer zone against its
northern neighbour; and to help thwart filibusters from Mexico and the
US.110 The colony would subsequently be renamed “Resurrección” and
then settled in a location that had earlier been La Colonia Militar de
San Vicente, attesting to the military concerns of post-war colonization
policy. Repatriation throughout the nineteenth century was therefore
not a policy based on nationalist sentiment or impulse, but one more
interested in maintaining territorial hegemony and a military presence
along the frontier.111 The archival trail ends here, but today El
Remolino is a town of about four hundred individuals—with a majority
(71%) considered “indigenous,” and about 24% speaking an
indigenous language.112
The case of El Remolino illustrates several important issues.
First, arguments in favor of supporting repatriation in the Eastern
Provinces could be made based on: (A) Legal/Treaty obligations, (B)
precedent in comparison with other repatriations, and (C) on
humanitarian grounds. Second, the inadequate response of the
Mexican government in this case supported widespread claims of
“administrative disorder” of the Herrera government as well as the
divide between regional and federal authorities in mid nineteenth
century Mexican politics. At the national level, the Menchaca case
shows us that state governments had little power or influence in
postwar Mexico. If states had difficulty in their appeals for federal aid
or assistance, then surely repatriates would likely have suffered a
similar fate. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a persuasive
argument could be made that there was an unresolved contradiction in
109. José Angel Hernández, Violence as Communication: The Revolt of La Ascensión,
Chihuahua (1892), 2:6 LANDSCAPES OF VIOLENCE (2012).
110. See SACAH, supra note 98.
111. Id.
112. El Remolino, PUEBLOS AMERICA.COM, https://mexico.pueblosamerica.com/i/elremolino-4/ (see for statistics).
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repatriation policy in the years after the Mexican American War,
namely, that the very monies intended for supporting those within the
ceded territories were never appropriately directed toward victims of
the war. Of the $15 million dollars paid by the U.S. as recompense for
the ceded territories, less than 1% made its way into the hands of the
actual victims of this “sale.” Guillermo Prieto, one time finance
minister, perhaps said it best with the following: “If you ask what use
Mexico made of all the money it got from the United States as a result
of its national tragedy, you should answer, without hesitation, that it
wasn’t in material improvements, defending the borders, or for public
safety. It went, almost entirely, to our creditors, foreigners mostly.”113
IX. BACK TO MEXICO MOVEMENTS IN CALIFORNIA, CA. 1850S
The Governor of Sonora, Pesquiera, correctly pointed out the
three factors that hindered the successful colonization of the frontier—
Indian raiding, depopulation caused by emigration, and insecurity. 114
These issues were intertwined and not easily resolved. Unless the
government solved the question of Indian raiding first, neither
repatriation nor long-term stability would have much of a chance along
the northern frontier. For the Governor, it was clear that “the day that
those incursions of the barbarians are finished, at that same moment
the state will remain populated.”115 While the “Indios Bárbaros” were
still not under the control of the state and “the border is found in the
abandonment that it is currently found, it is impossible to be able to
stimulate the population with any kind of offers.”116 And so the process
appeared to be a self-perpetuating mechanism, which only an end to
raiding and attacks could interrupt. Though framed from the
perspective of government interest, the Governor provides a
remarkable early recognition of the ironic, Mexican American
predicament of having to leave Mexican roots in the hope of one day
returning better able to sustain them. He notes that those with property
“abandon it” and then migrate to the U.S., while “the ones that do not
have it, seek it to leave it…in the hopes that at some time they will

113. Guillermo Prieto, Informes leídos en la Cámara de Diputados por el Secretario de
Hacienda, 40 (1852) (Mex.), quoted in RICHARD J. SALVUCCI, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND
MEXICO’S ‘LONDON DEBT,’ 1823-1887, 200–201 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009).
114. Enrique Cortés, Mexican Colonies During the Porfiriato, 10 AZTLÁN: J. OF CHICANO
STUDIES 1–14 (1979).
115. AHSRE, supra note 4, at 6-17-41.
116. Id.
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have it.”117
In contrast to the cases of Texas and New Mexico, California
support for repatriation seem to sprout from the ground amid
government inaction, or if you prefer, “administrative disorder.” In this
case repatriation would be buttressed by the institutional interests of a
secularized Catholic Church, by the accessible and mobile wealth of
California gold, and by an accompanying re-distribution of labor
involving significant ethnic based expulsions from California. As in
other regions, the indigenous population fighting for autonomy formed
a common enemy for US and Mexican national boundaries that were
perpetually contested. In California, the prime movers of repatriation
were not so much prominent individuals like Menchaca in Texas or
Ortiz in New Mexico, but by the group efforts of a variety of religious
and secular societies that formed during the period to fulfill the
aforementioned interests of returning to Mexico during times of
economic and social stress.
After gold was discovered in newly lost California in 1849, a
number of government officials pondered how Mexico could benefit
from some of the riches that were being extracted while the area was
simultaneously being depopulated.118 Gold, in this context, functioned
like a magnet that attracted groups of Mexican miners from their much
needed posts occupying the northern frontier. Already burdened by the
need to populate the deserts of Sonora, the Gold Rush now pulled these
very settlers away from the sparsely populated frontiers that cleared
the way for easier raiding by independent Amerindians, which also
guaranteed their autonomy. In other words, migration to the gold
placers of California left the neighboring state of Sonora open to
various Indian raids due precisely to this migratory depopulation
heading northward toward the gold placers.
Alluding to the silver lining in the depopulation of the frontiers,
General Ignacio Pesquiera, the Governor of Sonora, noted that,
although return migration was evident, the “returning citizens appear
to be motivated to return to the next station of the works,” and many
of them returned with vast amounts of wealth.119 They in turn “excited
many others” to make the trip northward. If this work was not
“absolutely impeded” by local authorities, the Governor estimated that
“next year’s emigration from this state will be surpassed in a somewhat

117. Id.
118. AHSRE, supra note 4, at 6-17-41.
119. Id.

HERNANDEZ - THE DECREE OF 19 AUGUST (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

THE DECREE OF 19 OF AUGUST 1848

8/11/2018 1:40 PM

27

greater number by this year’s emigrants.”120 Unless they were
prevented from working in the mines, this northern migration could
spiral out of control and with dire consequences for the frontier states
of Sonora.
Mexicans in search of work and of riches in gold country entered
a frenzied field composed not only of Euro American and Chinese
miners, but also Peruvian, Chilean, Spanish, and other “Latins” who
drew successfully from the mining expertise they had acquired in their
home countries.121 On the ground, reaction to “foreign” competition in
the mines took the form of an escalated level of violence in various
locales in Gold Rush California, culminating in the formation of
various extralegal “vigilante committees” and passage of questionable
laws.122 The courts reacted to growing multi ethnic conflicts by passing
the “Foreigner Miner’s Tax of 1851,” which levied a $20 per capita fee
on all “foreigners” wanting to stake claims in the gold placers of Upper
California.123 This racially targeted legislation applied to non-Euro
Americans; that is, those not of the “white race,” thus fueling the
number of potential repatriates for the states of Baja California,
Sonora, and Sinaloa.124 The Mexican government recognized that such
legislation and, even perhaps border violence as well, could serve its
interests by curtailing emigration and forcing its citizens to remain in
those lands “infested by Indios Bárbaros.” With this background in
mind, the Governor of Sonora, Ignacio Pesquiera, initiated some of the
first colonization policies for Mexican Americans in that state.
“Incensed by outrages committed [in the goldmines] by the Anglo
Americans against…Mexican Americans,” Pesquiera “offered lands to
the victims, aiding them and at the same time colonizing the lands.”125
In the process, according to the historian Enrique Cortés, the Governor
“set the stage for a pattern that was repeated throughout the rest of the
century.”126
Governor Pesquiera was not alone in his condemnation of “Euro
American” ill treatment of the working classes and the migrant
120. Id.
121. Sister M. Colette Standart, OP, The Sonoran Migration to California, 1848–1856: A
Study in Prejudice, 58 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA QUARTERLY, 333–357 (1976).
122. ROBERT M. SENKEWICZ S.J., VIGILANTES IN GOLD RUSH SAN FRANCISCO 156–202
(1985).
123. Foreign Miners Tax documents, 1850–1867, ONLINE ARCHIVE OF CALIFORNIA,
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/search?style=oac4;Institution=California%20State%20Library;idT
=001482545.
124. Id. (Miner’s tax).
125. Cortés, supra note 114.
126. Id.
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Mexican American populace. Several other politicians and
government officials put forth proposals to hasten the repatriation of
Mexican Americans while others supported the establishment of
military colonies on the northern frontiers of the newly established
international boundary.127 But very little assistance was forthcoming
from the central government. As in Texas, the most vocal and articulate
advocates for repatriation were Governors and politicians from the
border region itself. But their outrage did not translate into material
assistance or an organized repatriation process for at least four more
years. The answers were consistently always the same: the treasury is
depleted and the government is in “administrative disorder.”128
Still, a northern circuit with a lid on it presented a significant
potential benefit to the Mexican state. The unusual wealth available to
prospecting potential repatriates was well recognized, by those of the
frontiers, and those far removed from the border. Pesquiera observed,
“It can be calculated that more than 300 [migrants] have returned and
others are arriving daily, to such a manner that it can be expected that
that we will not lose all of this part of the emigrated population.”129
And, even in the face of long and dangerous journeys, returning
Sonorans “come very satisfied with the wealth of those bonanzas and
they report that except for the crime of robbery, all the others enjoy
immunity.”130 Many documents relating to Sonoran history point out
that Sonorans returned from the gold placers of California with
millions of pesos worth of gold.131 However, the borders drawn
between the U.S. and Mexico were also superimposed on land still
claimed by many indigenous groups willing to die and raid in its
defense. This presented a dilemma for any who had designs on the
wealth in the region’s natural resources.
The central government in Mexico City appears to have
administered the repatriation of Alta California as it did in Coahuila
and Chihuahua—that is to say reactively instead of proactively. At
least with respect to repatriation, Historian Griswold del Castillo has
noted that Californios in particular “had little financial help from the

127. JUAN N. ALMONTE, PROYECTOS DE LEYES SOBRE COLONIZACIÓN (Ignacio Cumplido,
26 Enero 1852) (Mex.); translated in Odie B. Faulk, Projected Mexican Colonies in the
Borderlands, 1852, 10 THE J. OF ARIZ. HISTORY 115–128 (1969).
128. MEMORIA DEL MINISTRO DE RELACIONES INTERIORES Y EXTERIORES, D. LUIS G.
CUEVAS, LEÍDA EN LA CÁMARA DE DIPUTADOS EL 5 Y EN LA DE SENADORES EL 8 DE ENERO DE
1849, 8 (Imprenta de Vicente García Torres, Ex-Convento del Espíritu Santo, 1849) (Mex.).
129. AHSRE, supra note 4, at 6-17-41.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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Mexican government in these ventures.”132 Yet repatriation was
successfully conducted from California to Sonora and to various
locales along the northern Mexican frontiers due primarily to the
repatriates themselves.
So who or what lay behind these
resettlements? Part of the answer lies with the way repatriation were
also contingent upon the depopulation of northern Mexican states, the
violence and opportunity of the Gold Rush in California, and the
formation of regional Repatriation Societies.
X. REPATRIATION SOCIETIES AND LOCAL PROTECTION
In the face of government neglect, Californios and Mexican
residents in California responded to the violence and land
displacement in a highly organized fashion by forming repatriation
societies. Independent and self-funded repatriation societies such as
Jesús Islas’ La Junta para Promover la Emigración de Todos los
Hispanos-Americanos Residentes en California (The Steering
Committee to Promote Immigration of All Hispanic-Americans Living
in California) and Andrés Pico’s La Sociedad de Colonización de
Nativos de California para el Estado de Sonora (The Colonization
Society of Native Californians for the State of Sonora), founded in
1855 and 1858, respectively, sprang up and established a trend in
California that we will not see for the other regions: the patriotic
naming of colonization and repatriation societies.133 By the time of the
Porfiriato (1876-1911), several more organizations of this kind had
come into being, such as Compañía de colonos para la Republica
Mexicana (1875), Compañía de colonos “La Esperanza” (1878), and
Sociedad de Colonización Benito Juárez (1880).134 Many of the
colonization schemes, like Pico’s La Sociedad de Colonización (1855)
were advanced “during the height of racial conflict and violence.”135 If
neither Mexico nor the US could respond, it was articulated at the time,
then locals took matters into their own hands and moved southwards
to Mexico in what can be termed a “back to Mexico” movement.
In 1855, Jesús Islas founded a colonization society in San José
that managed to recruit hundreds of people throughout California “by
running advertisements in the newspapers.”136 According to Griswold
132. GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra note 13, at 119.
133. Id. at 119–124.
134. See “Pimentel, I.M.—Compañía de Colonos para el Estado de Sonora “La
Esperanza” Propuesta,” in AHTN 1.29 (22) Leg. 8, Exp. 290. 28 Diciembre 1878.
135. GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra note 13, at 119–124.
136. Id.
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Del Castillo, Islas’ success “spurred others to imitation.” La Junta para
Promover la Emigración de Todos los Hispanos-Americanos
Residentes en California offered a similar rationale for returning to
México in an 1855 announcement.137 “Their major purpose,”
accordingly, “was to escape the inhospitable social and economic
climate of Anglo-American dominated California.”138 To promote
repatriation, Islas published an extensive broadside entitled Situacion
de los Habitantes Ispano-Americanos en el Estado de la Alta
California, printed in Mazatlán on 26 June 1855, which was carried by
at least one newspaper in California, El Clamor Público. Written as a
kind of manifesto, this document details how Mexican American
repatriation would benefit both potential colonists and the Mexican
government. A close reading reveals not only references to
humanitarian concern for the mistreatment of patriotic Mexican
Americans, but also the contradictory nature of that discourse when
gauged against state concerns for its failing economy and threatened
northern perimeters.
Islas begins his appeal for repatriation, not by mentioning the
violence visited upon the Mexican population, but by sketching the
larger structural forces that compelled him and other Californios to
seek better economic opportunities elsewhere. In effect, the author is
patently aware of a global economic crisis that has subsequently
impacted the lives of a population which now sought repatriation in
Mexico. As his opening salvo states, “[T]he epoch has arrived in
which the extravagance of the [gold] speculations, and the great
importance of foreign products, has brought a great monetary crisis,
that has caused the ruin of most of the bankers and innumerable
mercantile stores, as well as the complete annihilation of agriculture in
general.”139 The collapse of the agricultural sector to which he refers
had hit the “Ispano-Americanos,” made up of “Californios,
Mexicanos, Chilenos, and Peruanos,” particularly hard. By the time of
the publication of his broadside, the fallout from the Gold Rush was
unfolding before his eyes as migrants and other foreigners began to
seek out other opportunities. Perhaps it is no coincidence that in this
document, so-called “Ispano-Americanos” are framed as only suited to
performing agricultural labor, thereby ignoring the legislation and
racialized climate that excluded even the highly skilled from work in
137. JESÚS ISLAS, SITUACIÓN DE LOS HABITANTES ISPANO-AMERICANOS EN EL ESTADO DE
ALTA CALIFORNIA, 26 JUNIO 1855, (Puerto de Mazatlán: Imprenta de Rafael Carreon, 1855)
(Mex.).
138. GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra note 13, at 119–124.
139. ISLAS, supra note 137.
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the mining sector: He states,
It should be observed that most of the Hispanic-American
population, which includes Californios, Mexicans, Chileans,
Peruvians, etc. etc. had been dedicated to the work of agriculture, that,
due to the complete paralysis of and lack of appreciation for the
productivity of the country, they have all been obliged to abandon their
fields and labors and they are today found ruined and unable to secure
a destiny; and being the only work that the Spanish class can dedicate
itself to, given that in no other industry would they be able to compete
with the Saxon race, because they lack the necessary know-how, they
are seen today therefore in the saddest situation and without hope for
the future. Besides it should be added that one of the causes of the
discontent and general displeasure is the mistreatment that the
Hispanic-American population has received from certain classes of the
American populace.140
Reminders of the injustices this population had suffered could
play well on the patriotic sentiments of border officials and private
landowners across the border. Yet this bad treatment by the Americans
could also align with an ongoing military strategy. Islas states that
these potential colonists alone are “able to contain the advances of the
barbarous apache.”141 Officials who hoped to contain the “Barbarous
Indians” simultaneously sought to make use of Mexicans residing in
the U.S. for this purpose, and would offer them lands, tax concessions,
and free passage to government-sponsored colonies as enticements.142
The designs harbored by Mexican officials can be discerned by
the manner in which Mexican American labor is framed in
contradictory ways. The “energy” and “strength” of new migrants and
their families is always noted in the archival record, but the unique
140. Id.:
“Debe observarse que la mayor parte de la población Ispano-Americana, que
comprende Californios, mexicanos, chilenos, peruanos, etc. Se habían dedicado
al giro de agricultura, las que por causa de la completa paralización y ningún
aprecio de las producciones del país, se han visto todos obligados a abandonar
sus labores y trabajos y se encuentran hoy arruinados y sin poder obtener destino;
y siendo el único giro al que la clase española puede dedicarse, pues en ninguna
otra industria podrían competir con la raza sajona, por carecer de los
conocimientos necesarios, se ven hoy pues en la más triste situación y sin
esperanzas en lo futuro. Además debe agregarse que una de las causas del
descontento y disgusto general, es el mal tratamiento que la población HispanoAmericana ha recibido de ciertas clases del pueblo americano.”
141. Id.
142. Emigración a Sonora: A los Mexicanos, Hispano Americanos y Californios;
Manifiesto, EL CLAMOR PÚBLICO (Feb. 16, 1856).
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positionality of Californios as potential repatriates was presented with
a particular regional twist. Islas advanced the idea that, among the
different candidate populations available to occupy the northern
territories, only Mexican American repatriates would thrive given their
existing “compatibilities” with Mexico:
And what better time for Sonora to take advantage of the
circumstances, which under its liberal and protective laws, is the only
emigration that is acceptable because of its language, religion and
customs? Right now is the time to populate its frontiers with a
population that is useful, energetic, and trained by contact with the
Saxon race, the only one that is able to contain the advances of the
barbarous apache.143
Thus, even after decrying the mistreatment of Mexican
Americans and framing them suitable only for agriculture, he also
posits that it is precisely “contact with the Saxon race” that makes his
potential repatriates so desirable for Mexico in general, and Sonora in
particular. Note here, as well, that Isla’s points out that these potential
repatriates are the best colonists because they have also been “trained
by the Saxon race.” Notably, the discourse that Mexican migrants in
the US as somehow better that those that never left continues to this
very day, and here we have future leader of the Repatriation
Commission for the Western Region articulating this folk belief in the
mid nineteenth century.
XI. ISLAS’ COLONY AND THE MIXED MESSAGES OF REPATRIATION
On October of 1855, Francisco P. Ramírez, editorial writer for El
Clamor Público criticized the Mexican government and wrote an
extensive editorial that “encouraged [California] Mexicans and
Chileans to join Isla’s Junta Colonizadora de Sonora and return to
Mexico.”144 Disillusioned by the U.S. government’s lack of concern
about Euro American racism, Ramírez continued to support these
“back to Mexico movements” even when it appeared that politicians
in Mexico City would not be forthcoming with monetary support. The
commotion and enthusiasm for the project attracted the attention of
local and federal officials who noted the benefits of this migration to
the frontiers of the Mexican Republic. According to Islas’ report
published in the local paper, the project was received with “great
143. Id.; reprinted in Situación de los Hispano-Americanos en California, 19 EL CLAMOR
PÚBLICO (Oct. 23, 1955).
144. Id.
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enthusiasm by all of the populations of the state,” including the
Governor and the large landowners, “to protect the emigrants that
settle along the frontiers of the state.” For instance, locals came to the
aid of Islas’ project in Sonora. The village of Ures donated 200 fanegas
of wheat, 100 head of cattle, and land for those cattle as well as for the
production of cotton, sugar, and indigo.145
Recognizing the enthusiasm for Islas’ project earlier that year, the
federal government encouraged the state of Sonora to cooperate with
this “patriot” and appointed him as the colonization agent for the same
state. Always mindful of useful anti-American sentiment, the Minister
of Fomento, Manuel Siliceo maintained that there were “great
advantages” to welcoming these Gold Rush repatriates: “they do not
mix with the Anglo-Saxon race,” with whom they lacked a common
culture, and would fare much better as colonists in Sonora.146 Thus,
unlike the relatively organized Repatriate Commission of New
Mexico, or the botched appointment of the Eastern Provinces, the case
of the Repatriation Commission for the Western states was a case
where government officials in Mexico City co-opted the most visible
leader of a repatriation society and appointed him as Repatriation
Commissioner for the region.
In early 1856 Islas recruited around 300 people for his
colonization project and headed out for Sonora.147 News of the Islas
colony reached the Californio audience back at home via El Clamor
Público. By June of 1856, El Clamor Público noted that “more persons
than could conveniently be taken” continued to arrive and were
awaiting financial support for the journey. For the time being, Los
Angeles would be their base of operations.148 As success of the colony
became widely known, more and more repatriates set out for the
colony, now known as Saric, Sonora. At this time, according to
Griswold del Castillo, “it appeared that this colonization venture was
succeeding” and Islas reported the following a few months later: “We
are living peacefully and breathing the pure and agreeable air of this
beautiful climate.”149
But negative reports also surfaced, including one that alleged that
145. Emigración a Sonora, supra note 142.
146. Código de Colonización, supra note 1, at 607–612. This letter and four point
suggestion was also published in the 1856 publication of “Ministerio de Fomento,” (May 10,
1856).
147. La Colonia, EL CLAMOR PÚBLICO (June 7, 1856).
148. Id.
149. GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra note 13, at 121.

HERNANDEZ - THE DECREE OF 19 AUGUST (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

34

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

8/11/2018 1:40 PM

[Vol. 33:1

the Islas colony had joined in a rebellion against the central
government.150 The prosperity of the Islas’ colony in Sonora opened a
space among the Mexican community in California to debate the
merits of this process, and it appears that not all were in favor of
resettling in a country that had already abandoned them once. Making
a case that had been raised in New Mexico (and later in San Antonio,
Texas), locals questioned the logic of returning to a government so
fraught with “administrative disorder” and a history of abandoning the
frontier regions to “barbarous Indians” and then North Americans.151
In an extensive and critical letter signed by “California,” the author
noted the past history of the Mexican state left much to be desired.152
Colonists returning to Sonora would be subjected to “undisciplined
military officials and mercenaries” that have ruined the local
population with levies and forced contributions, according to his view.
Several exchanges for and against return migration were recorded
in El Clamor Público between a number of authors, but in the end, the
Islas colonization project proceeded forward and settled repatriates.
The “failed colonizations” of Texas and Coatzacoalcos in the 1820s,
the authors reminded the readers of El Clamor Público, were proof
enough of the government’s incompetence. The reason for these past
failures, were “for the very simple reason that although the government
of Mexico has judgment and discernment, the Mexicans do not have it
and with their anarchic craziness do not allow the realization of useful
business,” as the example of past colonization projects had effectively
proven.153 Living under U.S. rule was much better than living under a
Mexican regime that only a few years earlier had passed their fate into
the “hands of strangers.”154 “When were we the most happy, when we
pertained to the Mexican Republic or now?” asked the author.155 And
although wishing the colonists and the enterprise well, the letter writer
echoed the sentiment expressed by previous critics who argued that
Los Angeles was historically the refuge of Sonorans. The government
of Mexico, always in constant revolt and in “administrative disorder,”
made promises that it could not keep, and any repatriate would
probably be swept up in one of the many uprisings.156
Some recent research in Baja California in 2015 also revealed
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Sonora, EL CLAMOR PÚBLICO (Dec. 13 1856).
Id.
Id.
Comunicado, EL CLAMOR PÚBLICO (May 24, 1856).
Más Sobre la Emigración a Sonora, EL CLAMOR PÚBLICO (May 17, 1856).
Id.
Id.
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some further documentation on the case of Jesús Islas, which is worth
mentioning here in order to conclude this multi-state analysis of
repatriation and settlement along the northern frontiers of the republic
following the postwar environment. In early January of 1856, the
Ministro de Gobernación in Mexico City wrote to the governor of
Sonora that Jesús Islas repatriate colony was merely a ploy whose
underlying intention was to filibuster and separate Sonora from
Mexican control. Amid the varying revolts against the central
government, like El Plan de Ayutla (1855); Wars of Reform (185760); and El Plan de Tacubaya (1858), the governor was forced out of
office at the highest levels. Thereafter Jesus Islas was terminated as the
Repatriation Commissioner for the western region. Mexican officials
acknowledged the “sad situation that our compatriots keep, and other
individuals of the Spanish race,” but also realized that these
colonization schemes could also be employed to speculate empty lands
and then foment rebellions against the state, as in the case of the Ainza
Brothers.157
According to the exchange between the federal government and
the Governor of Sonora, the document makes note of the fact that
particular news had been obtained from the Secretary, Don Francisco
Tena, and others whom confirmed the idea that the colonization
company headed by the Ainza Brothers was purely interested in the
speculation of lands, and they have attempted to justify certain
payments by The Mexican government and then find a motive or a
pretext to make claims for payment by the same government. 158 The
observations that are shared between the government officials are
worthy of note because they speak to a much more nuanced view of
Mexican officials during this era. They note that although the family is
a native of the state of Sonora this individual was an under aged minor
when his family migrated over to California in the year of 1805. This
individual, the report continued, resided along with three of his
brothers, and each of these was also married to a woman from the
United States. As such, the exchange points out these marriages have
formed an interconnection between the families and the brothers have
now essentially taken on the customs and culture, and even the
inclinations of that particular country, which is to say the United
States. According to the exchange, these brothers have more affection
157. Desautorización de José de Aguilar, gobernador de Sonora, para que Jesús Islas,
quien se supone agente de colonización, envíe a sonorenses radicados en California a
colonizar terrenos en Sonora. Ures, 1 julio 1856, ARCHIVO DEL INSTITUTO DE
INVESTIGACIONES HISTÓRICAS (Fondo Pablo Herrera Carrillo, Universidad Autónoma de Baja
California) (Mex.).
158. Id.
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for California then for their native country, and Jesus Isla’s is
essentially part of that same family and mentality. Finally, the letter
establishes the relationship between these brothers and their brotherin-law Henry A. Crabb, whose name in Sonoran history is well known
as the last filibuster defeated by the Mexican government and their
indigenous allies. Mexican government officials also made the
observation that one of the brothers was perhaps “mentally ill” in his
attempts to try to convince the people of Sonora to separate from the
Mexican Government, but in the end the local prefect had him arrested
and Jesus Islas was also removed from his position.159
XII. CONCLUSION
In comparing the three cases of repatriation, the divergent
experiences of each of these cases reveals and almost too perfect
analogy for the repatriates experience in the post-war era. And
although I’ve only discussed a few cases in this particular article, I’ve
examined similar cases of repatriation and subsequent colonization
throughout the rest of the century, certainly enough to make the claim
here that repatriates from the North and migrants from the south built
the modern day border between the US and Mexico. Hence, this
particular microcosm does reveal some patterns about the first
Repatriation Commissions and the experience of those repatriates
returning to Mexico under the decree of August 19, 1848.
The case of New Mexico, because it was the most heavily
populated and the best-known of the three locations, became the locus
of most government attention, and most success, as it turns out.
Because the government moved quickly to appoint the well-known
anti-American Priest, Father Ramon Ortiz to the position, the
dissolution of this repatriate commission did not impede future
government efforts to effectively repatriate and resettle those Mexican
citizens that opted to return South after the end of hostilities.
The case of Texas, as it turns out, also reveals an experience that
can be read in the correspondence throughout the rest of the nineteenth
century, and this is that even amid periods of administrative disorder,
many repatriates took it upon themselves to leave South, with or
without the assistance of the government. What is with less doubt, is
the fact that these repatriates initially sought out the assistance of The
Mexican government. The option to either return, migrate southward,
or petition the Mexican government also highlights their belief not
159. Id.
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only in their own rights as citizens, but also their faith in the role of the
Mexican government during this time. The correspondence between
the Federal, State, and Local government is revealing and makes
interesting arguments in favor of this diasporic diplomatic
relationship—for lack of a better term.
The final case of California also reveals perhaps the most negative
of the experiences, in that a number of repatriates that did return south,
did so under some dubious circumstances and with intentions not in
line with those of the Mexican Government. As we saw in the case of
Jesus Islas, his initial project calling for the repatriation of Mexicans
in California to return to Sonora in the 1850s led to his collusion with
a number of filibusters that were eventually defeated only a few years
later. Indeed there are multiple cases in the Mexican archive where
Mexican repatriates also became sources of conflict, to such a high
degree, that the Mexican Government so fit to create an agency that
would go after and prosecute those Mexicans that encouraged others
that seceding from the Mexican Nation was a good idea.
The fallout of the postwar environment brought about the
Department of Colonization and the first Repatriation Commissions
dedicated to the repatriation and resettlement of Mexican origin
populations in the U.S. The primary function of these Repatriate
Commissions was to identify, administer, and then to accommodate
those Mexican citizens that opted to migrate across the new
international boundary following the signing of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848). Because the New Mexico Territory was
the most heavily populated, the creation of the First Repatriation
Commission for this region was considered the most important of the
three eventual assignments. Post-war instabilities, strapped financial
resources, shifting geo-political boundaries, resistance by U.S.
authorities, and internal accusations of financial mismanagement and
corruption all contributed to the dissolution of these initial Repatriation
Commissions. Legislation implemented to encourage Mexican
citizens to return via the Department of Colonization and the
Repatriation Commissions provided both the power of the Law and the
agents of the government to the foundation of dozens of settlements
along the newly established frontiers. In the end, colonies nevertheless
emerged along the northern frontiers between the New Mexico
Territory and through Baja California, due mainly to the will and
survival skills of the repatriates themselves.

